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I. INTRODUCTION
{1}Last year, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) acknowledged that it used an Internet electronic
surveillance system called Carnivore to investigate and prosecute criminal suspects in more than two dozen
cases. Carnivore is a software program developed by the FBI that can be installed on the network of an Internet
Service Provider (“ISP”), such as America Online, to monitor, intercept and collect e-mail messages and other
Internet activity made and received by individuals suspected of criminal activity.[1]. To date, the full capability of
Carnivore remains a secret—the FBI refuses to disclose the source code (computer language) that would reveal how
Carnivore operates, noting that disclosure of the source code would compromise the utility of the system to
prosecute criminal activity on the Internet. The FBI’s use of Carnivore has raised concerns that it violates privacy
rights, including the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution.[2].
{2}The FBI contends that the government’s use of Carnivore does not violate the Constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure because the FBI complies with established standards of proof in place to protect the
privacy interests of certain information. The FBI likens the information collected by Carnivore to the information
collected by pen registers and trap-and-trace devices.[3]. Pen registers record telephone numbers of outgoing calls
and trap-and-trace devices record telephone numbers from which incoming calls originate, much like a caller-ID
system.[4] Pen registers and trap-and-trace devices capture what is known as “transactional information,” such as the
digits comprising a telephone number, but do not capture the content of a communication. Pen registers and trap-
and-trace devices operate under a “reasonable suspicion” standard of proof, as further discussed below.
[5] Reasonable suspicion is a suspicion based upon the totality of the circumstances whereby activities give rise to
the probability of wrongdoing. 
{3}In contrast, the information collected by wiretaps is subject to a higher standard of protection under existing
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This is because wiretaps are used not only to collect transactional information but
also to intercept the content of a conversation over telephone wires or cables.[6] Content includes any information
concerning the “substance, purport, or meaning of a communication.”[7] Wiretaps operate under a “probable cause”
standard of proof. Probable cause requires that a search be narrowly focused on the interception of a specific targeted
conversation, based upon a special showing of need, and approved by a judge in advance.[8] Probable cause requires
the government to meet a more difficult standard than does reasonable suspicion. To meet the probable cause
standard, the government must show not only a probability of wrongdoing, but facts and circumstances “sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution” to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.[9] In
short, the reasonable suspicion standard offers a lower level of privacy and is a less legally demanding standard of
proof than the probable cause standard. The distinction between the two standards rests with the notion of
probability versus possibility. Reasonable suspicion relies upon a process that does not deal with hard certainties, but
with probabilities. In contrast, probable cause relies upon certain facts and evidence to form the standard of proof
necessary to secure a warrant for government intrusion of personal privacy.[10]
{4}The FBI maintains that existing federal statutory law permits the use of Carnivore under the reasonable suspicion
standard of proof that is needed for the government to operate a pen registers and trap-and-trace devices.[11] This
article argues that the FBI’s contention is wrong. The problem with the FBI’s use of Carnivore under the lower
reasonable suspicion standard lies with Carnivore’s likely ability to capture and copy communication content in
addition to transactional information, thus exceeding the scope and intent of the reasonable suspicion standard. This
article will argue that since Carnivore is capable of capturing content, law enforcement agents should have to meet
the higher probable cause standard that is already required for the use of electronic surveillance such as wiretaps. 
{5}This article further argues that the FBI’s use of Carnivore and similar Internet surveillance technology under a
reasonable suspicion standard demonstrates the danger that new technologies will eviscerate the privacy protections
of the Fourth Amendment. Current jurisprudence under the Fourth Amendment recognizes a privacy interest if an
individual believes he has a legitimate expectation of privacy and society is willing to recognize that expectation of
privacy. This paper examines the underlying circular reasoning that characterizes this Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence—i.e., that individuals have a right to privacy only if their expectation of privacy is reasonable in
context and validated by society. This context-based jurisprudence becomes particularly troublesome as
technological advancements produce more intrusive surveillance techniques that reveal communication content. As
such technologies become widely implemented, it is no longer reasonable for individuals to retain an expectation of
privacy when using means of communication that these technologies may intercept. In this way, electronic
surveillance technology comes to control privacy expectations rather than the expectation of privacy rights
controlling the use of such technology.
{6}I will refer to this current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding the right to privacy as a “context-based”
approach. This approach, I argue, is inferior to a natural rights based test, which treats privacy rights as inherent and
not subject to change with changes in social conditions. As I will demonstrate below, this natural rights theory of
privacy rights sets forth criteria resistant to subjective interpretation and thus social change upon which the Court
should rely in evaluating the standards that should apply to the use of modern electronic surveillance technologies,
such as Carnivore.[12] 
{7}Part I of this paper describes the current constitutional and statutory laws regarding electronic surveillance of
communication. Part II examines an alternative natural rights test to the current context-based test used to determine
whether a right to privacy exists in a communication. Part III applies this alternative test to Carnivore and similar
technology to show that natural rights jurisprudence better protects a person’s right to privacy in
communication. Part IV concludes that the probable cause standard protects a person’s natural right to privacy in
communication and argues that the probable cause standard should apply to the use of Internet electronic
surveillance tools such as Carnivore.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW REGARDING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
AND THE USE OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
{8}The Fourth Amendment provides a framework of privacy protections for personal communication.[13] The
Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizure, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.[14] 
The Fourth Amendment does not provide a “general constitutional right to privacy,” rather, it protects individual
privacy against certain kinds of government intrusion.[15]
A. The Katz Standard
{9}As noted earlier, current constitutional jurisprudence for electronic communications as established by case law
and the Fourth Amendment distinguishes between the content of a communication—protected by a high probable
cause standard—and the transactional information—protected by a lower reasonable suspicion standard.[16] In Katz
v. United States, the Supreme Court held that government intrusions in the form of electronically monitoring and
recording words spoken into a telephone receiver in a public telephone booth “violates the privacy upon which [a
person] justifiably relie[s] while using the telephone booth, and thus constitute[s] a ‘search and seizure’ within the
Fourth Amendment.”[17] The Court further held that the use of an electronic device that did not penetrate the wall of
the booth had “no constitutional significance.”[18]
{10}Katz established a two-pronged, context-based test by which courts may determine whether an individual has a
right to privacy in a communication.[19] The Katz test requires that in order to prove a privacy right protected by the
Constitution, “first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”[20] Katz established that the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.[21] In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan argued that while “a man’s
home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy,” he does not find that same level of privacy in
“objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders.”[22] 
{11}In 1967, the Supreme Court in Berger v. New York held that wiretapping is a “search and seizure” within the
scope of the Fourth Amendment and established that the government must meet a probable cause standard of proof
prior to obtaining a warrant authorizing the use of a wiretap.[23] As noted earlier, a wiretap is a form of electronic
eavesdropping in which the content of a conversation is recorded.[24] In Berger, the Court held that in addition to a
prior showing of probable cause, an application for a warrant to use a wiretap must meet a high privacy standard by
particularly describing “the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”[25] The Court defended the
use of the probable cause requirement, noting that its purpose is to “keep the government out of constitutionally
protected areas until it has reason to believe that a specific crime has been or is being committed.”[26] The Supreme
Court further requires electronic surveillance of telephone calls to specify the person whose communications are to
be recorded, “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched and things to be seized,” and obtain approval from a
judge prior to the use of such technology.[27] 
{12}On the other hand, three years later in United States v. Miller, the Court utilized the Katz test to dismiss any
legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the content of banking records, reasoning that such records are
negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions and that they contain only information voluntarily
conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.[28] The Court held that
there is no constitutional right or protection against the government’s warrantless acquisition of banking information,
such as checks, microfilm, deposit slips and other banking records, that have been disclosed to a third party financial
institution by the consumer.[29] The Court reasoned that there is “no legitimate expectation of privacy” in the
contents of the original checks and deposit slips, since the checks are not confidential, private communications but
instead are negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions and the business records of the bank.
[30]  Following Katz, the Court concluded, “what a person knowingly exposes to the public is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection.”[31]
{13}Similarly, nearly a decade later in Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court established that no probable cause
standard[32] is needed to acquire transactional records of information that a consumer conveys or transmits to a third
party, such as a bank or a telephone service provider.[33] The Supreme Court reasoned that there is "no actual
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed” because the caller had willingly transmitted these numbers to
a third party—the telephone company—and thus cannot reasonably expect privacy with regard to them.[34] Thus,
the government does not need a warrant grounded in probable cause to search or seize transactional information.
[35] Under the lower reasonable suspicion standard of review, “law enforcement need only show, through ‘specific
and articulable facts,’ that ‘there are reasonable grounds to believe’ that the information is ‘relevant and material' to
an ongoing criminal investigation.”[36]
{14}The Court further reasoned that the installation and use of a pen register by a telephone company does not
constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore, “because there was no ‘search,’
the court concluded no warrant was needed.”[37] Again, the Court applied the Katz test to determine whether the
government’s use of a pen register invaded a valid expectation of privacy. In applying the test, the Court reasoned
that (1) “the pen register was installed on telephone company property,” not the suspect’s property, so that the
suspect “cannot claim that his property was invaded or that police intruded into a constitutionally protected
area;”[38] (2) “a pen register differs significantly from the listening device employed in Katz because pen registers
do not capture the contents of communications,”[39] just transactional information (telephone numbers that have
been dialed); (3) “people in general” do not “entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they
dial;”[40] and (4) society is not prepared to recognize an expectation of privacy in telephone numbers dialed.
[41] The Court concluded, therefore, that a pen register’s limited capabilities do not constitute a “search” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.[42]
{15}There is very little constitutional jurisprudence regarding the government’s use of Internet electronic
surveillance to date. The Supreme Court recently held in Kyllo v. United States that government use of a surveillance
device “not in general public use to explore details of a private home that would previously have been unknowable
without physical intrusion is a search and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”[43] This bright line rule
is a product of the Court’s reasoning that privacy expectations are heightened in the home where “all details are
intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”[44] The Court reasoned that if,
without sense-enhancing technology, police cannot gather information without being actually present in the home, a
search has occurred.[45] The Court concludes, “to withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be to
permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”[46] In light of the Supreme
Court’s ruling, some in Congress have called upon the U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft to consider whether the
FBI’s use of Carnivore constitutes an illegal search and thus violates a person’s Fourth Amendment right against
unlawful search and seizure.[47] 
{16}In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently held in United
States Telecom Association v. Federal Communications Commission that law enforcement might not obtain content
information without a prior showing of probable cause.[48] In Telecom, the court noted that “a law enforcement
agency may receive all post-cut-through digits with a pen register order, subject to [a] requirement that the agency
uses ‘technology reasonably available to it’ to avoid processing digits that are content,” and concluded that “no court
has yet considered that contention and it may be that a Title III warrant is required to receive all post-cut-through
digits.”[49] The court described “post-cut-through dialed digits” as “a list of all digits dialed after a call has been
connected. Such digits include not only the telephone numbers dialed after connecting to a dial-up long-distance
carrier (e.g., 1-800-CALL-ATT), but also, for example, credit card or bank account numbers dialed.”[50] In other
words, the court held that law enforcement agencies may be required to show probable cause in order to obtain a
Title III warrant to access transactional information (dialed digits) because the nature of the information revealed
may be detailed and descriptive enough to be deemed content.[51]
{17}In another case, the Court of Appeals of New York addressed the privacy implications of pen registers that may
be capable of capturing the content of communications. In People v. Bialostok the Court held that under state
electronic surveillance law, a pen register capable of being used as a listening device required a warrant based upon a
showing of probable cause, rather than a judicial order obtainable based upon a showing of reasonable suspicion.[52]
{18}Thus, the limited case law that exists on point suggests that electronic listening devices such as a pen register
capable of capturing conversation content should be held to the same legal standard governing wiretaps—a probable
cause standard. As will be discussed further below, Carnivore appears to be capable of capturing more information
about a user than a pen register’s record of telephone numbers dialed, thus compelling the question of what legal
standard transactional information gathered from the Internet should be accorded. 
B. Critique of the Katz Privacy Standard
{19}As shown above, the Courts have used the Katz test to determine whether a privacy right exists under the
Fourth Amendment since 1967.[53] The discussion in this section will show that the Katz test is a deeply flawed
approach to determining whether a right to privacy exists.
{20}There are many problems with the Katz context-based approach to evaluating whether a privacy right exists in
any given circumstance. A central problem with the Katz test is that it is inherently subjective. The Katz two-
pronged test requires that in order to prove a privacy right protected by the Constitution: “first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”[54] Thus, in order for a privacy right to exist, society must agree with an
individual who asserts a privacy right. Society is charged with deciding Constitutional rights rather than the
Constitution defining the privacy rights society must grant individuals. The Katz test allows the courts to “hedge
their bets or duck principled analysis” in pursuit of defining what is reasonable.[55]
{21}In addition, the Court’s applications of the Katz context-based test to new technologies allows the scope of an
individual’s privacy rights to depend on the state of existing technology. The current Court’s context-based
jurisprudence focuses attention on a technology’s operation and application. As the Court wades through the
technical aspects of new technologies in order to determine whether the individual in question reasonably believes
he has a right to privacy, the Court reduces a right to privacy secured by the Fourth Amendment to an analysis of the
expectation of privacy residing in a specific technology. This becomes a tautology. The Court decides whether a
person reasonably believes he has a right to privacy in relation to the capacity of new government surveillance
technology X, Y, or Z to invade that privacy. 
{22}Finally, the Katz test only grants protection against government intrusion of privacy rights if the society, i.e.
people in a given community, are willing to agree that he deserves such protection. The Court’s use of subjective
criteria to determine whether privacy rights exist in the context of increasingly advanced surveillance of
communication results in an atmosphere in which people’s expectations are driven by what the government has the
technological capacity to do. This results in an increasingly lower expectation of individual privacy, which is
inherently subjective and therefore unreliable.
{23}In another case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in the United States v. Pinson held that any subjective
expectation of privacy that a person may have in the heat that radiates from his house is not one that society would
find objectively reasonable; thus, Fourth Amendment rights are not violated by the government’s warrantless use of
a forward looking infrared device (“FLIR”) to detect differences in surface temperatures of a person’s house.[56] In
this case, the defendant was convicted of manufacturing over 100 marijuana plants; police officers used the FLIR to
detect differences in surface temperature of the house where the marijuana was grown under high-intensity lights.
[57] In applying the Katz test, the court found that “any subjective expectation of privacy Pinson may have had in
the heat radiated from his house is not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable” and “that the
detection of the heat” by the FLIR “was not an intrusion into the home because no intimate details were” revealed
through its use and there was “no intrusion upon the privacy of the individuals within.”[58] The court stated that
thermal imaging does not threaten any of the interests in need of protection with regard to the home, specifically “the
intimacy, personal autonomy, and privacy associated with the home.”[59] Thus, the court concluded the defendant
failed to show an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.[60] But, this analysis of privacy rights is
unconvincing. The court’s argument is grounded in an analysis of privacy rights in the context of a given technology
—FLIR.[61]
1. Statutory Law
{24}In addition to constitutional jurisprudence, three federal statutes provide law enforcement with a legal
framework to obtain authorization for electronic surveillance.  In order to intercept telephone conversations, law
enforcement agencies must obtain a warrant pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968 (“Title III”).[62] Title III imposes specific limitations on the use of electronic surveillance.[63]. Before
issuing a warrant, law enforcement agents must show probable cause. [64] A judge may issue a warrant only if there
is a showing of probable cause, if the target of surveillance is substantially linked to the alleged offense, and if the
targeted communication will likely be captured through this surveillance.
{25}Advancements in scientific development and technology have led Congress to enact the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”). Consistent with federal constitutional requirements, ECPA created
a lower standard for capturing telephone numbers through the use of pen registers and trap-and-trace devices.
[65] The ECPA allows the use of a pen register or trap-and-trace device where law enforcement shows that the
“information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.”[66] In contrast, an order to
intercept the content of electronic communication requires a showing of probable cause that the target of an
investigation has committed a specific criminal activity. This is commonly sought under Title III. As noted, the FBI
contends that current federal statutory laws permit the government’s use of Carnivore under the pen register and
trap-and-trace laws.[67] 
{26}In 1994, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”) in response to
emerging telecommunications technologies. CALEA requires telecommunications carriers and equipment
manufacturers to provide technical capabilities within their networks to assist law enforcement with authorized
interception of communications and acquisitions of “call-identifying-information.”[68] As the D.C. Circuit Court
explained in U.S. Telecom, CALEA preserve[s] the government’s ability, pursuant to court order or other lawful
authorization, to intercept communications involving advanced technologies such as digital or wireless transmission
modes, or features and services such as call forwarding, speed dialing and conference calling, while protecting the
privacy of communications and without impeding the introduction of new technologies, features, and services.[69]
CALEA does not alter the existing legal framework for obtaining wiretap and pen register. In addition, CALEA does
not extend to “information services” such as e-mail and Internet access.[70]
III. ANALYZING CARNIVORE UNDER EXISTING FEDERAL LAW
{27}The FBI asserts current laws governing pen register and trap-and-trace devices under the ECPA provide the statutory
legal protection for the use of Carnivore.[71] Under a pen register and trap-and-trace device, the government must meet a
reasonable suspicion standard of proof, which is below the high probable cause standard. The government must only prove
that information likely to be captured through the use of electronic surveillance devices is relevant to an ongoing criminal
investigation. This is a low threshold of privacy protection, considering that the type of information Carnivore is suspected of
collecting far exceeds the transactional information the ECPA intended to permit law enforcement access to. 
{28}The FBI maintains Carnivore only collects transactional information and that it is programmed to filter out all
content, including the subject line and “re” information. This does not appear to be accurate.[72] According to the
Department of Justice’s independent review of Carnivore, conducted under contract by IIT Research Institute and the
Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago-Kent College of Law (“IITRI”), Carnivore appears to be capable of
collecting content-based information, such as the “addressing” portion of e-mail messages.[73] The “addressing”
portion of an e-mail refers to the “to” and “from” lines of an e-mail message, but not the “subject” or “re” lines of
the message. According to industry experts, e-mail addresses often carry a person’s name, place of employment or
other personal information. E-mail addresses often identify a person’s place of work and ISP provider. For example,
JaneDoe@mci.aol.com reveals that Jan Doe appears to be an MCI employee and uses America Online as her ISP
provider.
{29}Carnivore’s searches are also believed to have the capability to collect Uniform Resource Locator (“URL”)
information. “A URL can disclose specific webpages downloaded, websites visited, or even items purchased” on the
Internet.[74] An URL address can also reveal "the search terms that may have been entered in an Internet search."
[75] The FBI’s use of Carnivore is akin to someone following you around a bookstore tracking your every move,
taking notes on every book you browse through and collecting data from every person you speak with. The personal
information revealed by the "URLs and e-mail messages seem less like a pen register and more like the search of a
diary or a phone tap."[76]
{30}In addition, Carnivore reportedly collects and copies e-mail messages and website information of whoever uses
the same Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) as the criminal suspect. Thus, observers fear that when the FBI attaches
Carnivore to an ISP in pursuit of a suspected criminal’s online activity, the FBI actually records and reads every e-
mail message that enters that particular ISP; it does not effectively isolate the suspect’s messages and Internet
activities from the general mass of e-mail messages that flow through an ISP.[77] Innocent people who are not the
targets of an FBI criminal investigation could have their e-mail messages and Internet activities captured and
recorded by the technological capabilities inherent in Carnivore.
{31}Carnivore’s suspected ability to keep a record of someone’s Internet searches and record copies of someone’s
personal e-mail messages goes beyond the scope of the law governing pen registers. The President’s Working Group
on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet has recognized the dissonance between ECPA’s language and current
technology and noted:
[A]dvances in telecommunications technology have made the language of the statute obsolete. The
statute, for example, refers to a "device" that is "attached" to a "telephone line," [18 U.S.C.]. §
3127(3). Telephone companies, however, no longer accomplish these functions using physical hardware
attached to actual telephone lines. Moreover, the statute focuses specifically on telephone "numbers,"
id., a concept made out-of-date by the need to trace communications over the Internet that may use other
means to identify users' accounts.[78] 
{32}A trap-and-trace device or pen register installed on an ISP network is similar to the application of Carnivore on
an ISP network in that the Carnivore software is not installed on a telephone line; rather, it is installed on the data
network and the information which may be intercepted is not limited to that transmitted over a single telephone line.
[79]
{33}Thus, a key difficulty with the FBI’s use of Carnivore under the low reasonable suspicion standard is that the
potential quality and quantity of information Carnivore can search and secure transcends the scope of transactional
information. Transactional information is devoid of content, such as a telephone number; if the technology is
capable of capturing content, the probable cause standard should apply.
{34}This argument is vulnerable, however, because of the context-based nature of the Katz approach to recognizing
privacy rights. In applying the Katz test to determine whether a right to privacy exists in the Internet information
collected and copied by Carnivore, the court is forced to evaluate the technical capabilities of this Internet
surveillance tool and weigh those capabilities against whether "[1] a person . . . exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and [2] that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable'."
[80] This context-based approach to determine whether a privacy right exists under the Fourth Amendment
essentially holds that a privacy right exists if the collective society believes it exists. Therefore, even if an individual
demonstrated that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a given context, the court would deny him that right
if he failed to demonstrate that this expectation of privacy would be accepted as "objectively reasonable" by society. 
{35}Another key difficulty with the FBI’s use of Carnivore under the low reasonable suspicion standard is that the
nature of the information gathered using pen registers and trap-and-trace devices in a telephone environment is far
different from the information collected from the use of Carnivore in an ISP environment. The telephone system is a
circuit-switch network, meaning that there is a single, unbroken connection between sender and receiver (as with a
telephone call, for example). In contrast, the Internet is a "packet-switched" network, meaning “there is no single,
unbroken connection between sender and receiver.”[81] Instead, when information is sent, it is broken into small
packets, sent over many different routes at the same time, and then reassembled at the receiving end.[82] Carnivore
is believed to enable law enforcement to compile a detailed, substantive profile of a suspect’s Internet activity by
accessing these packets. According to the Federal Communications Commission, packet information contains call
routing information (such as telephone numbers) and content. Thus, packet information could allow the government
to receive both transactional information and content, all under the low criminal standard governing a pen register
(reasonable suspicion).[83]
{36}An argument can be made that like other forms of communication such as a telephone conversation. Internet
communication involves private content and ought to be protected under the Fourth Amendment probable cause
standard. However, if the courts were to evaluate Carnivore utilizing the Katz test, it is not clear whether a privacy
right would be found. For example, in applying the Katz test to determine whether the government’s use of
Carnivore invaded a valid expectation of privacy, the court might follow the logic established in Smith v. Maryland,
discussed supra at part I, and reason that (1) Carnivore is installed on an ISP’s property, not the suspect’s property;
thus, the suspect cannot claim that his property was invaded or that police intruded into a constitutionally protected
area; (2) Carnivore differs significantly from the listening device employed in Katz because Carnivore is allegedly
not intended to capture the content of communications, just transactional information; (3) there is no expectation of
privacy in transactional information, such as telephone numbers dialed; and (4) society is not prepared to recognize
an expectation of privacy in telephone numbers dialed.[84] The court would likely conclude, therefore, that
Carnivore’s capabilities do not constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
{37}The Supreme Court has traditionally enforced the Fourth Amendment against physical intrusions into person,
home, and property by law enforcement officers.[85] But, the context-based privacy rights analysis inherent in the
Katz test eviscerates the Fourth Amendment right to privacy by allowing technological advances to “outflank” the
existing legal framework. The Fourth Amendment must stand guard to ensure that Internet and electronic
surveillance by federal agents are not “contributing to a climate of official lawlessness and conceding the
helplessness of the Constitution and [the Supreme] Court to protect rights 'fundamental to a free society'.”[86] 
{38}.There is, however, an alternative theory of the Fourth Amendment that provides a better, more comprehensive
protection of privacy rights even in the face of technological change. That theory is premised on a natural rights
approach to privacy. One of the chief proponents of this theory is legal theorist Richard Epstein, who shares this
author’s critique of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Katz, noting that the “focus on the subjective expectations of
one party to a transaction does not explain or justify any legal rule, given the evident danger of circularity in
reasoning. More specifically, the legal result should not change because states have habitually practiced snooping, so
that no one has any reasonable expectation that their conversations will go undetected.”[87] Thus, Epstein argues,
the court should concentrate on the communication itself, not the medium in which it is delivered, whether by mail,
telephone, Internet or other means.[88] The act of communication, unlike the means of communication, should not
be subject to changes which result from successive improvements in technology.
IV. ALTERNATIVE NATURAL RIGHTS FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
{39}Philosophers have thought of privacy as “some immutable categor[y] of a person’s nature and activity that [is]
inherently private and should not be revealed to anyone.”[89] The ability “to exercise or experience privacy” refers
to control—control over actions, activities and/or information deemed private.[90] The books a person buys, the
videos a person rents, and the social activities a person engages in are examples of what type of information should
be protected under this definition of privacy. “[P]rivacy involves a struggle to control information. Personal privacy
is one’s desire, right or ability to control, withhold and reveal at will information about one’s person and
activities.”[91] 
{40}The essence of privacy may also be thought of in terms of a liberty. Philosopher John Stuart Mill defined human
liberty as “doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow.”[92]  Others refer to privacy as “the most
fundamental of all liberties,” “the right to be left undisturbed,” and the “right not to have one’s personal information
exploited without consent.”[93] If privacy is a fundamental liberty, akin in nature to such protected liberties as the
freedom of religion and the freedom of press, then it follows that privacy is deserving of a similar level of protection
as accorded fundamental freedoms by law. 
{41}Privacy can also be understood as a property right held by individuals.[94] John Locke’s theories established
the idea that “every man possesses property in the form of his own person.”[95] Libertarians[96] assert that no form
of behavioral freedom can exist without a foundation of property rights because property rights “induce people in a
free society to behave in ways that benefit the community as a whole.”[97]
{42}"A natural right is defined as an independent right not contingent on any situational or environmental factors. If
privacy is a natural right, that right would apply to both the real and online worlds, equally to employees, students,
library users, browsers, and consumers.”[98] In contrast, privacy construed as a context-based right, as in Katz,
allows for “trade-offs between personal privacy and public interests." The individual must surrender some privacy
for the common good and social advancement. Claims of privacy cannot be protected absolutely because of changes
in facts, conflicts between the needs of individuals and society, changes of circumstances or developments which
may give rise to new claims, and failure to assert certain claims.”[99] Privacy defined as a subjective right means
that privacy is an idea wedded to the underlying “basic task being undertaken, rather than to the individual.”[100] If
one adopts a context-based definition of privacy then “an individual’s right to privacy waxes and wanes based on
what one is doing.”[101] 
{43}Epstein introduces privacy rights grounded in natural rights jurisprudence as a superior approach to evaluate
questions arising from the use of increasingly advanced technologies because it focuses on the act of
communication, rather than focusing on the means or content of communication.[102] As already noted, natural
rights jurisprudence is grounded in the premise that individuals, because they are natural beings, have certain
inherent rights. Therefore, individual privacy is not a subjective expectation that leads to the belief that there is a
“right to privacy;” rather, it is fundamental that every human being has certain natural rights, chief among them the
right to be secure in one’s own thoughts, words, and actions, so long as they do not infringe on the rights of others or
harm others. Epstein rejects the notion that privacy rights are created by the state and says that, “rights are justified
in a normative way simply because the state chooses to protect them, as a matter of grace.” [103] To illustrate the
point, Epstein notes “a common example of personal liberty is that the state should prohibit murder because it is
wrong; murder is not wrong because the state prohibits it.”[104]
{44}Extending Epstein’s logic to Carnivore would suggest that the government ought to be restricted from using
Carnivore before proving probable cause and securing a search warrant because to do otherwise would infringe on a
person’s privacy in communication. The government can use Carnivore to collect content about an individual before
obtaining a search warrant, thus circumventing the protections offered under the Fourth Amendment and the need to
show probable cause. The underlying rationale for the probable cause standard is that an individual’s right to privacy
ought not be violated unless there is reason to believe a specific crime has been or is being committed. The Supreme
Court has historically interpreted the Constitution to impose a higher legal standard—probable cause—for search
warrants seeking to reveal content than for search warrants seeking to review non-content or transactional
material. The probable cause standard recognizes that communication is a human activity deserving a privacy
standard grounded in natural rights ideology rather than one determined by a subjective “reasonable suspicion”
standard.[105] Private communication “merit[s] the most exacting Fourth Amendment protection,” from government
intrusion and it is settled law that the probable cause standard of proof is the highest privacy standard available to
protect fundamental liberties.[106] 
{45}The probable cause standard of proof is the standard needed to evaluate the privacy implications of new
technology because it offers the highest form of protection from government intrusion, regardless of what form that
intrusion takes. What is important under the probable cause standard is the communication itself, not the medium in
which it is delivered, whether by phone, computer or other technology. The probable cause standard refocuses the
courts to concentrate on an individual’s utterances—the communication—rather than the means used to transmit the
communication. The court must look to see that law enforcement officers provide several factual details to prove
probable cause, including: a detailed affidavit alleging the commission of a specific criminal offense, the
communications facility regarding which subject’s communications are to be intercepted, a description of the types
of conversations to be intercepted, and the identities of the persons committing the offenses and anticipated to be
intercepted.[107] Alternate standards of proof do not require the government to show such an array of factual
findings and thus grant the government too much power by leaving much to the discretion of law enforcement agents
to use Carnivore to obtain information otherwise protected under the Fourth Amendment. 
{46}The FBI maintains that it uses Carnivore to identify and combat an array of criminal activity on the Internet,
including terrorism, espionage and information warfare.[108] “Information warfare” refers to foreign military
attacks on U.S. critical infrastructures, such as the telecommunications network and satellites, through the use of
computer viruses or by other means.[109] The FBI and foreign intelligence services view the Internet as a useful tool
for obtaining sensitive U.S. government and private sector information.[110] This may be true, but regardless of the
genuine intentions expressed by the FBI, the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect individual privacy, even
when the government believes there is good cause to encroach upon it. This paper does not argue against the merits
of lawful use of Internet surveillance tools, such as Carnivore; rather, it argues that the FBI’s attempt to extend pen
registers and trap-and-trace device orders to the Internet goes beyond the intent of the existing law and violates
constitutionally protected privacy rights found in an individual’s content of a communication. The FBI’s use of
Carnivore should be permitted under a high-privacy level protected by the probable cause standard of proof.
 V. CONCLUSION
{47}Carnivore illustrates the need to amend existing electronic surveillance laws to require probable cause prior to
the use of any Internet surveillance tools capable of capturing content. While there may be a legitimate law
enforcement need for Carnivore and other Internet surveillance technologies, the Fourth Amendment requirements
are not “unreasonably stringent; they are the bedrock rules without which there would be no effective protection of
the right to personal liberty.”[111] 
{48}The Fourth Amendment is not a mere formality; rather, it is a “rule that has long been recognized as basic to the
privacy of every home in America” and thus it is not beyond the scope of law enforcement officers “to comply with
the basic command of the Fourth Amendment before the innermost secrets of one’s home or office are
invaded.”[112] If the FBI wants to use Carnivore in an ongoing criminal investigation to aid law enforcement
efforts, it ought to secure a warrant through a showing of probable cause. In this way, the government is
appropriately shouldered with the burden to prove an individual should be deprived of their natural right to privacy
in communication—whether by mail, telephone or Internet. 
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